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ABSTRACT 
This article develops a model of intellectual labour augmentation to explain 
both the marriage wage premium and educational assortative mating. We 
suggest that husbands and wives are complementary factors of production 
where a spouse’s education and skills augment their partner’s productivity 
and earnings potential. We test this proposition using data from the 2000 US 
Census of Population and the 2003 Current Population Survey. Our results 
indicate that for working couples the marriage premium for husbands and 
wives is directly related to the education level of their spouses – suggesting 
that positive assortative mating may be attributable to the labour market 
effects of intellectual augmentation of married households. 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The marriage premium literature finds that married 
men earn more than single men, even after controlling 
for cross-sectional differences in education, race, 
region or other observable characteristics 
(Korenman and Neumark, 1992; Daniel, 1995; Loh, 
1996; Chun and Lee, 2001). In recent studies using 
panel data to control for unobservable characteristics, 
the wage premium is diminished but still present 
(Daniel, 1995; Cohen, 1999). An additional finding in 
Loh (1996) is that a wife’s education enhances her 
husband’s wage premium, although the reserve is not 
necessarily true. Over time, social scientists have 
developed numerous theories to explain the marriage 
wage premium for men. These paradigms range from 
the preferential treatment of married workers to the 
traditional family specialization model (i.e. men work, 
women run the household) (for a summary, see Reed 
and Hartford, 1988; Gorman, 1999). 
 
The traditional model suggests that specialization 
occurs in a marriage when a husband concentrates his 
efforts in market work and his wife focuses primarily 
on home production. This pattern of specialization 
suggests that individuals maximize their well-being by 
marrying partners very different from themselves. One 
difficulty with the specialization model is that it is 
inconsistent with long-term labour market trends. In 
the United States, for example, the past 30 years have 
witnessed a significant increase in the proportion of 
married couples where both spouses work for pay – a 
trend that also applies to married couples with 
younger children (US Department of Labor, 1999). 
 
The assortative mating literature, on the other 
hand, claims that women and men are more likely to 
marry spouses at the same socioeconomic level in 
terms of education and professional background 
(Mare, 1991; Quain, 1998; Suen and Lui, 1999). 
Mare (1991) traces this pattern from the 1930s 
through the 1990s in the United States. Quain 
(1998) finds that from 1970 to 1990 educational 
assortative mating existed for both marriage and 
cohabitation. The assortative mating literature suggests 
that when choosing a spouse individuals look 
for partners who share common productivity traits or 
desires for household public goods (Lam, 1988, 
Jepsen and Jepsen, 2002). 
 
 
A relatively unexplored area of inquiry is the 
question of whether both the wage premium and 
assortative mating might be explained by intellectual 
interaction between spouses that can augment each 
other’s productivity. In other words, a spouse can 
provide efforts that enhance the earnings potential of 
their partner. This article develops a formal model 
that assesses the potential interactions between a 
person’s human capital and the productivity and 
earnings of his or her spouse. The implications of the 
model, with respect to labour augmentation, are 
examined via an empirical analysis that explores 
whether husbands and wives are complementary 
factors of production. In particular, we investigate 
the extent to which a spouse’s education and skills 
will enhance their partner’s productivity and earnings 
potential. 
 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Even a cursory survey of the extensive marriage 
premium literature yields a consistent empirical 
outcome: married men earn significantly more than 
their nonmarried counterparts, whereas the opposite 
appears to be true for married women. Daniel (1995) 
illustrates that the male marriage premium is found in 
different cultures, over previous centuries, and 
throughout a person’s worklife. Estimates of this 
premium have ranged from Koreman and Neumark’s 
(1991) 15% to Bartlett and Callahan’s (1984) 32%. 
Chun and Lee (2001) find that the wage premium is 
12.6% but ranges from 3.4% for husbands with wives 
who work full time to 31.4% for husbands with wives 
not in the labour force. Summaries of the extensive 
documentation of the marriage premium exist in, 
Kenny (1983), Bartlett and Callahan (1984) and 
Nakosteen and Zimmer (2001). 
 
Although the empirical evidence of the male 
marriage premium is considerable, there is much 
less agreement on the reasons for its existence. 
Korenman and Neumark (1990) offer three possibilities 
for this difference. First, married men are more 
productive than unmarried workers, perhaps due to 
higher motivation and attachment to the labour 
force; second, employers display favouritism for 
married men over unmarried men; and third, married 
men possess characteristics that are more desirable in 
marriage and labour markets. They find that when 
controlling for human capital differences, hourly 
wage premiums seem to be the result of faster wage 
growth for married men as compared to nevermarried 
men. Their analysis of company personnel 
files indicates that married men hold higher paying 
jobs within the firm, but do not tend to earn more 
than their unmarried colleagues within the same job 
category. Married men also receive higher performance 
ratings, thus increasing their chances of 
promotion. 
 
Cohen (1999), using data from the 1995–1997 
Current Population Survey, examines gender, race 
and ethnic differences in the marriage premium as 
well as the cohabitation premium. He finds that 
marital status is more of a factor for white women 
than for any other demographic group. Nevermarried 
white women earn more than married, 
previously married or cohabiting white women. 
Additionally, never-married white women earn as 
much as white men. This pattern is reversed for black 
women with the never-married earning least. 
Hispanic women show no significant differences in 
income by marital status. 
 
Loh (1996), building on Becker’s (1975) theoretical 
work on the family, tests the following three 
propositions concerning the marriage wage premium: 
(1) working men with nonworking wives 
have a larger premium than unmarried men or men 
with working wives because they have greater 
opportunities to accumulate human capital; (2) the 
positive marriage premium should occur for both 
self-employed and salaried workers as long as they 
are married; and (3) currently married men ‘who 
cohabitated with their present wife before marriage, 
should have a higher premium, all else being equal’. 
 
His empirical analysis of NLSY data fails to find 
support for the first proposition: Men with working 
wives have a higher, not lower, marriage premium. 
Even more surprising, men earn more when their 
wives are more educated, even when those wives 
do not work outside the home. Loh suggests several 
reasons why this might be true. They might have 
fewer children but expend higher monetary outlays 
per child. Therefore, the wife’s higher 
education becomes a proxy for a decreased demand 
for children. Loh, however, found no support for this 
proposition. 
 
 
The second reason Loh suggests for the positive 
influence of wife’s education on husband’s wages is 
that high wage men marry more educated women. 
Further analysis does not support this explanation 
either. The third reason Loh suggests for the higher 
wages of husbands of more educated wives is that 
they have better opportunities. Perhaps the presence 
of a better-educated spouse allows for better career 
decisions leading to higher wages. Loh, on further 
analysis, finds that the differences between wives are 
more important in explaining the marriage premium 
than the differences between the husbands themselves. 
Loh also found that his prediction concerning 
self-employed men was not supported. In fact, 
unmarried self-employed men earned more than 
married self employed men. Similarly, Loh’s prediction 
concerning the benefits of cohabitation on men’s 
wages after marriage is not supported. 
We are left then with the interesting finding that as 
a wife’s education increases, so does the husband’s 
wage. Loh states that the source of the higher wage 
appears to lie in unobserved heterogeneity among 
men in the sample. The article suggested one other 
possibility, namely, that more educated wives 
improve the resource allocation decisions of the 
husbands. We suggest that the primary mechanism 
by which a spouse enhances his or her partner’s 
earnings potential is through intellectual labour 
augmentation, which is consistent with the notion 
of assortative mating. 
 
In the assortative mating literature, Mare (1991) 
suggests that a consistent pattern of like marrying like 
has existed over time. Although this may be affected 
by the amount of time between leaving school and 
when the person marries, it remains a consistent 
finding. In fact, homogamy in mating increased from 
1930 to 1980. According to Mare, this may result 
from the increasing competition for high wage 
earning wives. The similarity in education would 
also predict the similarity in labour force opportunities. 
Thus we would expect education to be an 
important factor in assortative mating. Watkins and 
Meredith (1981), in fact, find that this is the most 
important variable in spouse selection. 
 
In addition to positive assortative mating by 
education, others have found positive assortative 
mating by work status and earnings potential. 
Kalmijn (1994) finds that cultural assortative 
mating, as measured by occupational schooling (i.e. 
lawyers marring lawyers), plays a central role in the 
spousal selection process. Jepsen and Jepsen (2002) 
find that positive assortative mating exist for both 
opposite and same sex couples with married opposite 
sex couples the most alike in terms of age and 
education. Nakosteen and Zimmer (2001) claim that 
assortative mating also serves to enhance an individual’s 
earnings potential. The results from their study 
suggest that spouses appear to match on the basis of 
unobserved earning traits, and that individuals who 
have a tendency to be highly productive in the labour 
market tend to marry similar individuals. These 
forms of positive assortative mating are consistent 
with the notion of labour augmentation. 
 
Suen and Lui (1999) pose the question, ‘how 
efficient is the marriage market in optimizing marital 
output’? Their conclusion is that it is fairly efficient. 
Since couples match education and wage characteristics 
and thus maximize their total output, augmentation 
in both time and intellectual interaction are 
likely to take place. With similar jobs and education, 
the ability to discuss and evaluate courses of action 
should be maximized. Although direct evidence of 
this does not exist, the higher wages of men with more 
educated wives certainly suggest it as a possibility – a 
possibility we explore in this article. 
 
 
III. THE MODEL 
 
In this section we develop a model of labour 
augmentation that is consistent with both the marriage 
wage premium and the assortative mating literature. 
Following the structure of Suen and Lui (1999), we 
assume that men and women who enter into marriage 
base their spousal selection on a joint production 
function, Zij=Z(Fi, Mj,), where Zij is the joint 
production when female i marries male j. In an 
efficient market males and females sort themselves to 
maximize their well-being (Becker, 1973). In the 
traditional ‘specialization-and-exchange’ model the 
cross partial in the production function, ∂2Zij/∂Fi∂Mj is 
negative. The negative relation implies that inputs are 
substitutes and negative assortative mating should 
occur (i.e. one spouse with high education who 
specializes in market production and one with low 
education who specializes in home production). This is 
the traditional homemaker/bread-winner paradigm. 
On the other hand, the assortative mating literature 
suggests the opposite type of sorting: that is, highlyeducated 
individuals tend to be matched with highlyeducated 
spouses (Mare, 1991; Suen and Lui, 1999). If 
positive assortative mating is also an efficient marriage 
market then the cross partial, ∂2Zij/∂Fi∂Mj is positive. 
In this sorting equilibrium the positive cross partially 
implies that spouses are complementary factors (Suen 
and Lui, 1999). This implies that a husband with a high 
education is more productive when he marries a wife 
of high education and vice versa. This model also 
suggests that the wife’s productivity rises with 
matched characteristics of the husband. 
If this complementary relation is present, a wage 
premium should develop for both the husband and 
wife to reflect the benefits of marriage. Yet, empirically 
the wage premium has generally only been found for 
husbands. We suggest this may develop because of 
labour augmentation where a spouse enhances a 
partner’s productivity by providing his or her own 
time and effort on the other’s work. This augmentation 
maximizes household income but not necessarily 
individual income. 
 
To address more directly the issue of labour 
augmentation in a positive assortative mating general 
equilibrium framework, our model extends Suen and 
Lui’s (1999) efficient marriage to address how spouses 
may allocate their time once an efficient match has 
been made. In our model, a spouse enhances their 
partner’s productivity by providing his or her own 
time and effort in support of the other’s work. 
Following Daniel (1995), we hypothesize that a 
spouse can use their time in three ways: first, they can 
engage in market work; second, they can augment 
their spouse’s productivity; and third, they can pursue 
leisure activities. For simplicity, we omit leisure time 
and focus on the choice between direct market work 
and augmenting a spouse’s productivity using an 
additively separable production function. Thus the 
joint maximization decision can be expressed as: 
 
 
 
 
In expression (7) we see that this result has an 
ambiguous effect on wages: a husband and a wife 
could both experience higher wages in marriage.1 
Expression (7) is the labour augmentation outcome. 
The intuition of this model suggests that spouse who 
chooses to augment their partner’s productivity can 
raise their partner’s earnings potential and thereby 
create a wage premium. For example, a husband’s 
wage premium can be interpreted as wife’s payment 
for productivity enhancement. Examples of labour 
augmentation include spouses who proofread their 
partner’s presentations, serve as sounding boards, or 
provide other forms of professional support. 
 
Daniel (1995) suggests that ‘just as a worker’s 
market human capital affects her ability to perform a 
job, augmentation capital affects her ability to 
augment productivity’. If spouses are complementary 
factors of production, as suggested by Suen and Liu 
(1999), labour augmentation will develop because of 
positive assortative mating. Daniel (1999) conjectures 
that ‘the ability of one spouse to augment the 
productivity of the other may depend upon the 
match between the couple’s characteristics or jobs _ 
one lawyer might be better at augmenting the 
productivity of another lawyer’. We suggest that this 
type of labour augmentation capital develops due to 
the positive assortative mating that occurs in efficient 
marriage markets where the cross partials are positive. 
 
Empirically, the earnings potential of an individual 
(i) can be modelled as a function of their productivity 
(Zi), which in turn is influenced by their own 
characteristics (Xi), and by the characteristics of 
their spouse (XS). This model can be expressed as, 
 
 
 
 
In our model, the marginal effects of both the 
husband’s and wife’s education suggest that spouses 
who are complementary factors provide another 
reason for positive assortative mating. Thus, positive 
assortative mating occurs because of productivity 
reasons as husbands and wives augment each other’s 
market wages. 
 
 
IV. DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
For our empirical analysis we obtained crosssectional 
samples of working couples from two 
data sources. The first source is the 1% Public Use 
Microdata Sample (PUMS) of the 2000 US Census 
of population. Our second source is the March 2003 
Annual Demographic file of the US Current 
Population Survey (CPS). Both the Census and 
CPS data provide large, representative samples of 
workers in the US labour market. Our samples of 
married couples consist of nonagricultural wage and 
salary workers with positive weekly earnings, who 
were not in the military, or enrolled in school. Given 
these sample criteria, we were able to construct a 
sample of 1 92 905 married working couples from 
the census data, and 2775 couples from the CPS 
data.3 
 
 
 
 
The variables used to estimate the human capital 
wage models (Equations 10 and 11) are described in 
Table 1. In general, the independent variables are 
similar across both samples. Table 2 presents the 
descriptive statistics for working couples from the 
CPS and Census data. As expected, men have higher 
weekly earnings, more work experience and are more 
likely to work full-time than women. One finding 
consistent with the assortative mating – labour 
augmentation proposition is that ~20% of working 
couples are employed in the same occupation or 
industry as their spouse.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 presents the estimated wage regressions, by 
gender, for the CPS and Census samples. Columns 1 
and 3 show the estimated coefficients (and SEs) for 
males whereas columns 2 and 4 report the results for 
females. In the interest of space, we report only 
the regression estimates for the independent variables 
most relevant to our test of the labour augmentation 
hypothesis. In general, the estimated signs of 
the coefficients on the independent variables are 
consistent with those reported elsewhere.5 
The results in Table 3 indicate that there are 
positive, and significant, effects on earnings that are 
due to the interaction between a worker’s education 
and the education of his or her spouse. This is 
consistent with the labour augmentation – assortative 
mating proposition. However, this result is complicated 
by the negative coefficient on spouse’s education 
for men and women in both samples. Thus, we 
need to rely on expressions (11) and (13) above to 
obtain a more accurate assessment of the full nature 
of the interaction between spouses’ education and 
earnings. 
 
 
 
 
 
In Tables 4 and 5, we report the marginal effect of 
an additional year of schooling on earnings in 
a household by their spouse’s education. In 
Table 4, we calculate Equations 14 and 15 for each 
year of schooling from 8 to 20. We show that for a 
woman with low levels of education, an additional 
year of schooling by her husband actually lowers her 
wage. However, at higher levels of education there is 
a positive effect on her wage, ceteris paribus. In the 
census sample, the cross from a negative to 
a positive effect on wages takes place at the high 
school level; in the CPS, this crossover occurs 
essentially at the junior college level. Table 4 also 
shows that the husband’s returns to education are 
enhanced by their wife’s level of education going 
from about 6% for a husband with a wife with a 8th 
grade education to about 9% with a wife with 
20 years of education. 
In Table 5, we show the marginal effect of a wife’s 
increased level of education on both the husband’s 
and the wife’s wages calculated using Equations 12 
and 13. Here we find that as wives increase their 
education level the husband’s wage is enhanced for all 
but the lowest level of education. The enhancement is 
particularly true at high levels of education with an 
additional year of education by a wife increasing her 
husband’s wage by 4% when the husband has 
20 years of schooling. The wife’s return to her 
education is also enhanced by her husband’s education 
with the returns from schooling rising from 
about 5% for the Census data and 4% for the CPS 
data when the husband’s educations climbs from 8 to 
20 years of schooling. The results from both Tables 4 
and 5 suggest that positive assortative mating has 
productivity effects with both husbands and wives 
augmenting their returns to schooling through their 
spouse’s level of education. 
 
The results from Tables 4 and 5 can also be linked 
to the standard empirical findings regarding the 
marriage wage premium. For married men we see 
that labour augmentation occurs for all levels of 
schooling. This is consistent with the virtually 
universal finding that marriage has a positive effect 
on male earnings levels. On the other hand, for 
 
women we see that the derived marriage wage 
benefits from labour augmentation begin to occur 
at approximately the sample average level of schooling. 
Thus, for a significant portion of females, the 
education level of their husbands exerts little, or even 
a negative, effect on earnings. This is consistent with 
the ambiguity of empirical findings concerning 
marital status and female earnings levels. 
The estimated coefficients on SAMEOCC and 
SAMEIND provide a mixed message with respect to 
men with spouses employed in the same occupational 
or industry category. The census results indicate that 
men incur a penalty for having spouses in similar 
occupations, whereas the CPS results indicate a 
positive effect on wages, albeit at the margin of 
statistical significance. For the Census and CPS data, 
there appears to be a wage penalty for men with wives 
employed in the same industry (SAMEIND). On the 
other hand, women with spouses employed in the same 
industry or occupation have significantly higher 
weekly earnings than women who work in different 
industries or occupations from their spouses. These 
somewhat inconsistent results may be attributable to 
the degree of aggregation in the industry and occupation 
variables. An additional factor may involve the 
industries and occupations that are most likely to see 
matched spouses. For instance, over 65% of men and 
women who are employed in the same occupation as 
their spouses (SAMEOCC¼1) are found in the two 
highest-paid categories: managerial and professional 
workers. This appears to have a positive effect on the 
earnings of women, but a more ambiguous effect on 
the earnings of men. For married couples employed in 
similar industries (SAMEIND¼1), nearly two-thirds 
of those workers are found in three categories: 
manufacturing, wholesale-retail trade and educational/ 
health services.6 The estimated coefficient on 
SAMEIND in Table 3 indicates that females rather 
than males receive a premium for having a spouse 
employed in the same industry. Overall, women 
appear more likely to benefit from the potential 
complementary effects of having a spouse employed 
in the same occupation or industry. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article develops a theory of intellectual labour 
augmentation to explain both the marriage wage 
premium and the possibility of educational assortative 
mating. Intellectual labour augmentation means 
that individuals search for spouses who have similar 
characteristics in order to maximize joint household 
production. This labour augmentation also suggests 
that having spouses of similar educational backgrounds 
helps to create a wage premium that reflects 
the synergies of marriage. Our empirical analysis of 
earnings data for married working couples from the 
US Census of Population and the Current Population 
Survey supports the labour augmentation argument. 
In general, the wages of married men and women are 
positively influenced by the educational attainment of 
their spouse, although the effect is less pronounced 
for women than it is for men. However, the 
interaction effect between the education of men and 
women tends to increase with the level of educational 
attainment of both spouses. Thus, we estimate that 
the complementarity in spousal education is more 
important for highly educated couples. An additional 
finding is that married women enjoy a wage premium 
if their spouse is employed in the same industry or 
occupation. However, this result does not appear to 
be true for married men. 
 
The labour augmentation between husbands and 
wives reported in this article is consistent with two 
recent labour market trends: the increase in the 
average level of women’s educational attainment 
relative to men, and the significant increase in the 
percentage of married couples where both spouses are 
employed. These trends appear to conflict with the 
more traditional specialization model of spousal 
selection as proposed by Becker and others. 
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NOTES 
 
1. A fourth outcome is possible where the marginal product of labour augmentation is zero for 
both and no labour augmentation wage effect is found in a marriage. 
 
2. We use working couples for our samples in order to concentrate on testing the labour 
augmentation hypothesis for both male and female wage earners. In our sample we use all 
observations where both partners are either working part time or full time. We do the same 
analysis for a subset of workers where both spouses are full time married workers, because 
hours worked might be an endogenous decision in the household. The empirical results, 
however, are similar. We report these results in Appendix 1. 
 
3. The census aggregate occupational and industry categories were used to construct the 
SAMEOCC and SAMEIND variables. The occupational categories are: managerial, 
professional, sales, clerical, operatives, production/craft, labourers, construction/extractive and 
service; the industry categories are: construction/extractive, manufacturing, wholesale/retail 
trade, information, finance, professional services, education and health services, recreation and 
hospitality, other services and public administration. 
 
4. In addition, approximately 10% of the working couples in the Census and CPS samples are 
employed in the same industry and occupational categories. These percentages are 
significantly higher than what would occur under a random matching of couples by industry or 
occupation. 
 
5. The regression results reported in Table 3 have been corrected for possible sample selection 
bias via Heckman’s (1979) technique. The selection model is based on a probit estimation of a 
labour force participation equation (either in or out of the labour force) as a function of a 
respondent’s experience, education, disability status, and the presence of young children. The 
full set of empirical estimates is available from the authors upon request. 
 
6. For the CPS sample, the distribution of men and women with spouses in the same 
occupational category is: managerial (18%), professional (49%), service (9%), sales (7%), 
clerical (9%), operatives (1.5%), production/craft (5.3%), labourers (0.3%) and 
construction/extractive (0.5%). The corresponding percentages for the industry categories are: 
construction/extractive (1%), manufacturing (18%), wholesale/retail trade (16%), information 
(2%), finance (6%), professional services (7%), education and health services (34%), recreation 
and hospitality (5%), other services (3.5%) and public administration (5%). The corresponding 
percentages for the Census sample are similar. 
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APPENDIX 
  
